Abstract
Introduction
Participation and decentralisation became popular themes with governments, civil society organisations and rights groups invoking the malleable meanings of these terms to demand better governance, based on the assumption that devolution of power and people's involvement in decisionmaking are yardsticks of good governance (Goulet 1989 , Maro 1990 ). This good governance agenda was supported by the World Bank, which advocated decentralisation and participation as requisite for the success of both urban and rural development projects (World Bank 2000) .
Evidence also emerged of the impact of participatory governance, especially in the fields of fiscal decentralisation (Smoke 2000) , natural resource management (Gibson et. al. 2005 ) and urban governance (Bagchi and Chattopadhyay 2004) . Communities were shown to be good managers of local resources by virtue of their local knowledge and their ease of rule-enforcement (Fizbein 1997 ).
In the long term, local management was expected to promote a feeling of ownership of resources amongst the community (Ostrom 1990) . Meanwhile, disparate colours of the politics of decentralisation have also emerged. For instance, Agrawal and Gupta (2005) , based on their fieldnotes on the government-created user groups in Nepal's Terai protected areas, observe that the likelihood of participation was higher among the economically and socially well-off. In contrast, Krishna (2006) and Mattes (2008) reported from eastern India and South Africa respectively that spaces for participation are increasingly being taken up by the poor. Critiquing the transfer of responsibility of participation to the poor, Kothari (2001) highlights that it reifies the powerlessness of such people in the name of giving voice. Further, Williams et al. (2003) note that the overemphasis on participation at the lower strata of devolution of power occludes the simultaneous need for reform at the top.
The indigenous or tribal populations in India, also called adivasis (first inhabitants) or formally, Scheduled Tribes, have been economically, socially and politically marginalised during the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial times (Rao 1996) . Any program to decentralise power in tribal areas, therefore, mandates careful scrutiny of its participatory effects that takes cognizance of the history of adivasi marginalisation. This study looks at a specific project of decentralisation, taking the instance of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (hereafter, the Forest Rights Act or the Act or the FRA), which seeks to devolve powers to elected institutions at the lowest level to facilitate the process of recognizing individual and community rights of the adivasis over forests.
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Good Governance and Transformation Ribot et al.(2006 Ribot et al.( , p. 1865 ) define decentralisation as 'any political act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at the lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy.' When the process is confined to the setting up of new structures, it can be called deconcentration or administrative decentralisation. In contrast, political decentralisation involves downward accountability and is often legitimised through local elections (Ribot et al 2006) . Hickey and Mohan (2005, p.243) define technocratic decentralisation as 'reducing or smartening the central state, rather than as a political project aimed at transforming state legitimacy and forging a new contract between the citizens and the local state.' While technocratic governance is, of course, an essential feature of the bureaucratic model of administration, it does not go beyond its confines to engage deeply with society. In contrast, transformative decentralisation occurs where the governance model directly confronts oppressive social orders to spur change (Hickey and Mohan, 2004) .
Technocratic versus transformative decentralisation
Participatory approaches in this framework are more likely to achieve successful outcomes where: (a) they are pursued as part of a wider radical political project confronting the existing structural arrangements and not just 'working around them'; (b) they are aimed specifically at securing citizenship and participation for marginal and subordinate groups; (c) the effort is not just to bring people to participate in the political process but to transform and democratise the political process itself so that the exclusionary tendencies of the process are allayed, and (d) they seek to engage with development as an underlying process of social change (Hickey and Mohan, 2004, p.168 ). The hope is that these efforts would help decentralisation move beyond its technocratic essentials.
Participation as spatial practice
Participation can be 'located' if it is looked at as a spatial practice (Cornwall 2004 Thus, the attempt in a successful participatory model should be to create new spaces that call for citizen engagement. Such spaces can take different forms depending on the complexity of interactions and the stakeholders involved. Cornwall (2004, p.80) derives from Lefebvre (1974) 
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The limitations of these programs cast doubt on the empowerment of tribal communities that the state sought to achieve. The tribals had been traditionally disadvantaged and marginalised by colonial as well as postcolonial forest policies (Guha 1983 , Rao and Sankaran 2003 , Bhatia 2005 . On the one hand they had been subjected; on the other, they had internalised their identities as a classified, 'scheduled' community (Bose et. al. 2012 ).
In response to widespread campaigning by civil society organisations and tribal rights groups, the 
Research Setting
The experiences of the state of Kerala in decentralised governance have been commended around the world (e.g. Parayil 1996 , Sen 1999 , Véron 2000 3 .
Heller (2001) 
Tribal land legislation in Kerala
A number of land-related laws have been passed in Kerala, many of them having implications for the tribals (Table 1 ). The Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963, the pioneer legislation for land redistribution in the state, has been criticised for benefitting the non-tribals at the expense of tribals. Bijoy and Raman (2003) report incidents in which the non-tribal communities took tribal lands on short-term lease for cultivation and registered themselves as 'tenants' with the authorities. Later on, they claimed and obtained titles to the lands, dispossessing the tribal owner who had then become the 'landlord'. owners. The Rules under the Act, which were published only a decade later, also prohibited transfer of lands from tribals to non-tribals. However, the adivasis had to pay compensation equivalent to the original sum received while selling the land, which could be paid by taking a loan from the government (to be repaid in 20 years, as allowed by the Act). This condition proved to be a disincentive for adivasis to reclaim their lands (Bijoy 1999) . The Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1999, on the other hand, held that encroachments of up to two hectares of land be condoned, jettisoning the need to restore alienated lands. For claims below two hectares, alternate land was to be given elsewhere. The new law was supported by all the major political fronts of Kerala who argued that the 1975 Act was unjust to the non-adivasi settlers (Bijoy 1999) .
Adivasi land struggles in Wayanad
The adivasi struggles in Wayanad can be traced back to colonial times when some tribes like the 
Research questions
This study sought to answer three research questions:
1. To what extent has the inclusion and participation of tribes in decentralised governance fructified in Kerala, with a focus on securing of land titles?
2. How have the Forest Rights Committees used the powers under the Act?
3. What technocratic/transformative elements characterise the decentralisation process?
The contextual relevance of these questions becomes obvious when it is noted that the Forest Rights 
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Methodology
This work is a qualitative study based largely on interviews conducted in Bathery and Mananthavady (Table 2 ). Of the 33 respondents, 27 belonged to tribal communities, while the others were government servants not from the Scheduled Tribes. Of these 27, nine were women, two of whom were activists for tribal rights issues. 
Observations and Results
The voices collected from the field bring out how the Act per se and its implementation are perceived by the different stakeholders. In general, all the interviewees agree that the Forest Rights Act is unprecedented in its content, but opinions do not always converge when it comes to the relevance of the Act in Wayanad, or the utility of the legislation in promoting participatory governance.
Securing tenure
Securing land titles is a key provision of the Act. There are no deadlines set for the FRA process to be completed, but the steps relating to making claims and surveying have been completed in Wayanad.
The FRCs were thus constituted end in 2009. Table 3 shows the number of claims filed in Bathery Taluk: Of the 3,537 individual claims filed, only 62% have been finally granted. From Table 3 , it can also be seen that although 201 community claims were filed before the FRCs, none has been given out. The
Tribal Development Officers say that the surveys for community rights have yet to happen, but no timeline, not even a deadline, has been set to complete the process. This is in spite of the fact that community rights are a central provision of the FRA pertaining to the rights to graze, fish, collect forest products, protect traditional knowledge, maintain shrines and clear trees up to a maximum of 75 trees per hectare for development purposes (s.3 of the Act).
Acknowledgement of community rights has been one of the breakthroughs of the Act. In fact, what are labelled as 'community rights' have always been the very base of adivasi life:
Adivasis have never had the need to call the rights over commons by any particular term like community rights. I struggle to translate the English word to Malayalam while holding classes and convince them that there is a defined concept like this.
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A C Radhakrishnan, FRA awareness class instructor
In a random sample of 1,000 from the official list of beneficiaries from Bathery Taluk, the average land received by beneficiaries was found to be 0.115 hectares. The maximum size in the sample is 1.27 hectares, in spite of the FRA allowing the grant of land up to 4 hectares to each claimant family. 
Access to Minor Forest Produce
Access to Minor Forest Produce (MFP) is another significant provision of the Act. Clause 3 (1) (a) of
Chapter II of the Act grants 'the right of ownership, access to collect, use, and disposal of minor forest produce which has been traditionally collected within or outside the village boundaries'. Clause 2(1)(d) of the Rules under the Act delineate that the disposal of minor forest produce shall include local level processing, value addition, transportation in forest area through head-loads, bicycle and handcarts for use of such produce or sale by the gatherer or the community for livelihood.
However, adivasis continue to be denied permission to access products from their own forests.
Products like gooseberries, medicinal plants, honey etc., which have been collected by the adivasis traditionally, have formed a major part of the FD's revenue, leading to a lack of willingness on their part towards relinquishing those rights: While the original intention of this arrangement can be proffered as autonomy for the Forest Rights committee, there is no check to make sure that an actual participatory assembly of all the men and women in the neighbourhood is held. The risk of participation becoming symbolic is, therefore, high. The process of decentralisation The comment by the Tribal Development Officer sheds light on how the different departments perceive each other. The Tribal Development Office, in fact, is closer to the adivasis in that they implement various schemes related to tribal welfare. But the one aspect of adivasi life that they do not have jurisdiction on is the forests. Also, the Panchayat, Forest Department, Revenue Department and the Tribal Development Offices continue to work in their own closed circles.
These results, while juxtaposed with the long history of adivasi land struggles that the district has seen, raise some disquieting questions. The FRA appears not to have 'sunk into' the minds of the adivasis and the officials alike as they have failed to see the immense transformative potential of the Act. Adivasi communities in Kerala, unlike their counterparts in the north and central regions of India, 6 were not involved in any separate struggle asking for the Act or demanding its implementation.
As a consequence, the FRA became just another piece of legislation sent out to the state administration from New Delhi to be executed with a new set of bureaucratic machinery.
The FRA was envisaged to be a larger project reversing the historic injustice to adivasis and ushering in an era of justice through recognition of rights. It is to be underlined that this is not merely a onetime scheme or project for distribution of land titles but constitutionally recognised legislation that recognises ownership of land and resources as a right. However, progress on the implementation of the Act in Wayanad shows a performance that is diluted and weak. It could be inferred from the field notes that there is no larger vision associated with the FRA process as far as its implementation in Wayanad is concerned. It has not even been recognised as a part of the land reforms movement for which Kerala is known, the benefits of such reforms confined only to nontribal communities. The state is also generally known for the degree to which issues are politicised and fought out through democratic discourse. In the Wayanad case, however, the mainstream political Considering the situated nature of participation under the FRA, although the provision for the creation of FRCs was supposed to create an 'invited space' for citizen consultation, these spaces still remain closed on the ground. All adult members of the community were supposed to come together to register their claims, discuss community rights and make their demands at the FRC. However, the functioning of the FRCs has mostly remained slapdash. The spaces for participating in the survey processes and understanding how the distribution of land is done have also remained closed. The different episodes of the adivasi struggles in the past did create 'claimed spaces' for negotiations with the state. However, the fact that the FRA has not figured in such negotiations limits the viability of such claimed spaces in facilitating a discussion on forest rights. The forest space has thus been coopted thoroughly into the technocratic machinery. The result is that the adivasis choose to stay away from any of these intersecting spaces and retire to their usual lives, relinquishing their rights to change the way the space with which their existence is bound is shaped. In the absence of a larger movement from the adivasi community to demand the implementation of the FRA, the question of representation remains problematic. The fragmented adivasi community is represented by a few voluntary organisations that have not yet taken up the FRA as a key project.
CJLG May 2013 67
Conclusion
Understanding forest rights in its complexity can only be facilitated if there is an inherent project of respecting indigenous rights and recognising diversity. The Forest Rights Act, in its formulation, has
given abundant opportunities to bring in such a project to fruition while simultaneously creating a meaningful structure for devolution of powers. Lack of a wider political project, absence of a unified campaign by the adivasi forums, fragmentation within the community, devolution of powers in the design of the decentralisation program to authorities with a history of indifference towards the tribals and lack of awareness regarding the potential of the legislation emerge as the main constraints from this case study. Transformation cannot occur as a part of the structure itself, it must be brought in through actual (and not symbolic) participation by creating open and invited spaces, the onus of which has to be taken by the state and the community concurrently.
